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CAN AN ALGORITHM BE DISTURBED?  
MACHINE LEARNING, INTRINSIC CRITICISM,  
AND THE DIGITAL HUMANITIES
JAMES E. DOBSON
Never act except in such a way that your action may be programmed.
— Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960 
(1986)
He who regards poems only as objects to be “processed” according to 
one or another method should admit to himself that the processing 
of leather into shoes is more useful to mankind than the processing of 
poems into interpretations.
—Sigurd Burckhardt, Shakespearean Meanings (1968)
Within literary and cultural studies there has been a new focus on the 
“surface” as opposed to the “depth” of a work as the proper object of study. 
We have seen this interest manifested through what appears to be the return 
of prior approaches including formalist reading practices, attention to the 
aesthetic dimensions of a text, and new methodologies that come from the 
social sciences and are interested in modes of description and observation.1 
In arguing for the adoption of these methodologies, critics have advocated 
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for an end to what Paul Ricoeur has termed “the hermeneutics of suspicion” 
and various forms of ideological critique that have been the mainstay of 
criticism for the past few decades.2 While these “new” interpretations 
might begin with what was once repressed through prior selection criteria, 
they all shift our attention away from an understanding of a “repressed” or 
otherwise hidden object by understanding textual features less as signifier, 
an arrow to follow to some hidden depths, and more as an object of 
interest in its own right. Computer aided approaches to literary criticism, 
or “digital readings” (not an unproblematic term, to be sure), have been 
put forward as one way of making a break from the deeply habituated 
reading practices of the past; but their advocates risk overstating the case 
and, in giving up on critique, they remain blind to untheorized dimensions 
of the computational methods on which they rely. While digital methods 
enable one to examine radically larger archives than those assembled in 
the past, a transformation that Matthew Jockers characterizes as a shift 
from micro to “macroanalysis,” the fundamental assumptions about texts 
and meaning implicit in these tools and in the criticism resulting from use 
of these tools belong to a much earlier period of literary analysis.
Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best’s well-known essay, “Surface 
Reading: An Introduction,” which introduced a volume of the journal 
Representations in 2009, is dedicated to the topic of “How We Read Now” 
and examines several variants of surface reading as an alternative to depth 
or “symptomatic” reading. Marcus and Best name the digital humanities 
and computer-assisted reading as one important and particularly hopeful 
methodology for the future of humanistic study. They write: “Where the 
heroic critic corrects the text, a nonheroic critic might aim instead to 
correct for her critical subjectivity, by using machines to bypass it, in the 
hopes that doing so will produce more accurate knowledge about texts” 
(2009, 17). Replacing the “heroic critic” of the symptomatic era with the 
heroic code, they imagine an objective world of bypassed subjectivity. 
Without cultural knowledge, biases, political commitments, in other 
words, without being situated, Best and Marcus believe that the machine 
and the algorithm can produce more “accurate knowledge” about the 
world brought into being by subjective human beings. This is to say, that 
digital or computer-aided readings are imagined as escaping the subjective 
constraints that draw us to certain passages, figures, or conclusions. An 
algorithm can be excluded from the hermeneutics of suspicion because 
it knows nothing of the concept of “hidden” depth. This leads Best and 
Marcus to claim that digital readings might restore a “taboo” set of goals 
for humanistic study: “objectivity, validity, truth” (17).
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Heather Love’s recent and provocative essay on surface reading, “Close 
but not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn” (2010), takes up 
some of the challenges to close reading identified by Best and Marcus. 
Two main concerns with criticism as now practiced concern Love: first, 
literary critics have privileged witnessing and empathy and thus turned 
literary criticism into an ethical act that draws its power from the charisma 
of the critic rather than the text. Secondly, the hermeneutical method 
of close reading that is the trademark of humanistic disciplines and the 
methodological lingua franca of most of the criticism of the past fifty 
years—one should note, from the New Criticism to Marxism to feminism 
to deconstruction—has isolated the work of humanists from other 
disciplines within the university that do not closely attend to language. 
While digital humanists like Jockers and Franco Moretti have imagined 
the only solution to these two problems to be the rejection of reading 
literature as we read now, to give up on the singular text (the corpus) in 
favor of collections of texts (corpora), Love wants to keep reading singular 
objects like the novel but to rethink the activity of reading. She suggests 
that we renounce “depth hermeneutics” in favor of an approach she 
provocatively turns into a motto for our moment: reading closely, but not 
deeply. What keeps Love securely on the surface of her essay is her belief 
in what she herself terms the “normative view” of science, and in particular 
the social sciences. She wants to bring literature and humanistic study 
more broadly into the sphere of the scientific view in order to participate 
within the currency presently available to this discourse. This supposedly 
benign “normative” aspect enables Love to reconceive interpretation 
as description. This is to say that Love presupposes an uncontested 
descriptive view of literature. This so-called “normative” view of the 
sciences links Love’s surface reading and Best and Marcus’s belief that the 
digital humanities can deliver “objectivity, validity, truth” (2009, 17).
In this essay I will examine practices and methods of computer-aided text 
mining because these collectively represent what I take to be the strongest 
form of digital humanities. The machine learning algorithms that enable 
the majority of text mining efforts are widely used in other disciplines and 
are not a marginal and arbitrary corner of the digital humanities but central 
to the effort to reposition humanistic research within the bounds of current 
university research protocols. Matthew Jockers asserts that computational 
text analysis is “by all accounts the foundation of digital humanities and 
its deepest root” (Jockers 2013, 15). This “root” of the digital humanities 
has a long history, one that Jockers connects to the digital concordances 
of Thomas Aquinas produced by Father Roberto Busa in the 1940s and, 
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as I will show, is attached to the deep dreams of structuralism and its 
desire for a science of interpretation. I will begin by first discussing in 
detail several proposed methods of machine reading as possible answers to 
the call for surface reading. These quantitative methods come to literary 
studies from outside the humanities and are well understood in certain 
contexts, especially those within the empirical sciences; my reframing of 
computer-aided text mining will draw out what I take to be the theoretical 
assumptions implicit within these models of meaning. I’ll then turn to 
an analysis of structuralism in order to demonstrate the degree to which 
the digital humanities and machine readings of text have resurrected key 
structuralist presuppositions. In the process, I will discuss two important 
critiques of structuralism from within literary studies and consider what 
we still have to learn from these interventions. Finally, I will argue that 
these critiques enable us to call into question the division between the act 
of interpretation and objective, scientific methodology in the rhetoric of 
this strong form of the digital humanities.
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS THE “UNSUPERVISED”
Even though his methodology is not explicitly or even necessarily digital, 
Franco Moretti is a useful figure to examine the stakes of the digital 
intervention being proposed by critics like Best and Marcus. Like Love, 
Moretti has, for some time now, articulated his frustration with close 
reading. Unlike those critics exhausted with suspicious close reading 
because its moves have been appropriated by those with differing political 
agendas (Latour 2004, 225–30), or because criticism encourages forms of 
exposure that reinforce the critic’s sense of knowing more than the object 
studied (Sedgwick 2003, 138–43), or even because critique has just become 
rote and boring (Felski 2009, 31), Moretti’s frustration originates within 
the limitations of the narrow scope of close reading that complicates his 
ability to criticize larger forces and systems. Calling the slow, careful close 
reading of an individual text a “theological exercise,” he accuses literary 
critics of giving too much attention to a small set of mostly canonical 
texts. Moretti wants his proposed practice of distant reading to enable an 
understanding of “the system in its entirety” (Moretti 2000, 57). In other 
words, it is precisely the failure of abstraction foreclosed by the specificity 
of the singular close reading that motivates Moretti’s desire for a distanced 
position capable of a producing a systemic critique.
When he puts his distant reading theory into practice in Graphs, Maps, 
Trees (2005), Moretti presents an alternative approach to the digital yet 
still qualitative methodology imagined by Best and Marcus. What keeps 
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Moretti’s claims to systematicity resulting from his quantitative analysis 
“honest” is the fact that his target is not something like a hard, empirically 
knowable reality, but rather the socially constructed fiction known as 
the market. Thus, Moretti is able to stake out a stronger position for 
quantitative research within the humanities:
Quantitative research provides a type of data which is ideally independent 
of interpretations, I said earlier, and that is of course also its limit: it 
provides data, not interpretation. . . . Quantitative data can tell us when 
Britain produced one new novel per month, or week, or day, or hour for 
that matter, but where the significant turning points line lie along the 
continuum—and why—is something that must be decided on a different 
basis. (Moretti 2005, 9)
Moretti’s turn to the scientific quantitative from the humanistic 
qualitative takes as its presupposition some fundamental distrust of the 
act of interpretation. The interpretive act of reading, in his account, is too 
tied up with evidence. Literary critics have what social scientists would call 
a selection bias that always informs the practice of close reading. Moretti, 
like almost all digital humanists, seeks to address this problem through 
the separation of his scientific methodology with its accompanying “data” 
from the hermeneutic act of interpretation. The substitution of what 
close reading would call textual evidence with quantitative data—for 
Moretti, the length of book titles, the number of books within specified 
categories sold, the number of booksellers—enables his strong claim for a 
quantitative approach to literature.
However, there is of course no such thing as context-less data. The 
concept of raw data, as Lisa Gitelman and Virginia Jackson have recently 
argued, is something of a misnomer, an oxymoron as they point out in the 
title of their jointly edited volume (Gitelman and Jackson 2012). We should 
doubt any attempt to claim objectivity based on the notion of bypassed 
subjectivity because human subjectivity lurks within all data. This is 
because data does not merely exist in the world: each data point is an 
abstraction imagined and generated by humans. Not only that, but there 
are always criteria informing the selection of any quantity of data. This act 
of selection, the drawing of boundaries that names certain objects a “data 
set” introduces the taint of the human and subjectivity into supposedly 
raw, untouched data.
Data, contra to the desires of Best and Marcus, cannot ever be said 
to be computed, distilled, and analyzed free of subjective intent. Best 
and Marcus do not elaborate on the specific digital technologies that 
they believe will lead to objectivity and they do not differentiate between 
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computer-aided and supposedly completely automated approaches. Even if 
data were free of subjectivity, the approaches that have been presented as 
completely automated, unsupervised, and human-free turn out to be even 
more tainted by subjectivity than the original “data” selection process. 
Machine learning, the set of algorithms that enable computer-aided text 
mining, is a relatively recent technology. It provides us with an ideal test 
case for examining the possibility of objective readings of text. To provide 
some background, we first need to situate machine learning in its place as a 
branch of artificial intelligence. These techniques uniquely have the ability 
to address an incredibly large amount of data with varying degrees of input 
from a researcher. They have been used to transform approaches in fields as 
diverse as economics and cognitive neuroscience. The “learning” element 
of machine learning suggests the continued repetition of an automated task 
that can reflexively integrate the results of past tasks. Ideally, with each 
repetition the algorithm improves the accuracy with which it performs the 
task and therefore it can be considered to be “learning.”
There are two kinds of machine learning algorithms: supervised 
and unsupervised. Supervised machine learning can categorize data 
into predefined and predetermined categories; data, in the case of the 
application of machine learning to literature, would be groupings of words 
of various lengths and sizes. What makes supervised machine-learning 
algorithms “supervised” is the existence of a training dataset. In this form 
of machine learning, there are always two datasets. The human researcher 
parcels a set of texts or other objects into two buckets. The first bucket 
is the known and familiar bucket, the training dataset. Here “labels” are 
attached to each object that defines its membership within a category. 
The algorithm “trains” itself on the training dataset. After this training 
it extracts sets of features from this data and uses them to categorize the 
objects into the researcher-created categories. These features are then 
used on what is called the “test” dataset. The texts comprising the “test” 
dataset should be similar to those found within the training dataset. The 
algorithm then automatically sorts the data within the test dataset into 
the categories defined by the researcher.
If the use of the term “supervised” by computer and information 
scientists suggests the presence of what Best and Marcus would call 
“critical subjectivity,” then “supervision” must be understood as the 
unavoidable presence of the human subject within this area of machine 
learning. Supervision means that our interpretation of the results, the 
output from the algorithm, must take into account decisions made by 
the researcher to establish a set of initial conditions. These conditions 
might be the existence of labels that, while not providing explicit rules 
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or criteria for categorization, mark each dataset, each text or grouping 
of words, as unambiguously a member of a particular category. Thus the 
results of any supervised algorithm contain traces of decisions made by 
the researcher—precisely the “subjectivity” this work might be imagined 
to lack. Unsupervised algorithms would presumably be uncontaminated 
by any such influencing traces of the researcher. Yet this unsupervised 
state cannot be said to exist. The researcher must, as Gitelman and 
Jackson remind us, necessarily make a set of decisions in forming the 
original input dataset, even if it is completely unlabeled and considered 
disorganized. We must also choose an algorithm from the range of 
available options and then an implementation of this algorithm. Not 
only will different machine-learning algorithms give different results, 
but differing implementations of the same algorithm may not agree. 
Reproducible results will depend upon the precise replication of the 
software and hardware environment used. Reproducibility remains an 
ideal for all computational fields, but in practice is very difficult to achieve, 
even more so when we are searching for small yet statistically significant 
bits of evidence for our claims.
Supervised methods are frequently called computer-aided. A program 
or application using machine learning might, for example, make use of a 
dictionary of key terms that define topics of interest that can be used to 
index documents. One such method is known as sentiment analysis. One 
of the leading researchers in the field defines sentiment analysis as “the 
computational study of opinions, sentiments, and emotions expressed in 
text” (Lui 2010). Used mostly by social scientists and those in marketing 
fields, sentiment analysis takes a set of terms associated with positive 
and negative emotions and then automatically sorts texts or fragments 
of texts into these pre-defined categories. The sub-categories and key 
terms are hardly universal; these terms are necessarily the product of the 
specific period and cultural milieu in which the dictionary was assembled. 
A notable example can be found within the psychology dictionary that 
forms part of the sentiment analysis dictionary distributed with one 
popular commercial text mining package, Provalis Research’s QDA 
Miner/WordStat.3 WordStat’s psychology dictionary contains a set of 
3,150 total terms that align concepts and phrases into groups associated 
with psychoanalysis. Not just any “dialect” of psychoanalysis, however: 
Colin Martindale, the author of this dictionary, chose to organize his 
terms into areas associated with the popular practice of the 1970s, Jungian 
psychoanalytic analysis.4 One slightly idiosyncratic grouping found 
within the dataset, “Icarian Imagery,” demonstrates the limitations of 
the model used by this dictionary. Martindale identified these terms, and 
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also those terms making use of these root-words, with the sub-category 










Of course psychological concepts from more widely accepted strands of 
psychoanalysis, including Freud’s own theories as well as developments in 
the field after the influence of the cognitive and brain sciences, have no 
representation within the dictionary. Thus this dictionary would enable 
one to locate potential sources of evidence for reading Jungian imagery 
and associated categorizations of sentiment within a text but not, say, 
the terms used by the New Psychology of the 1890s that preceded 
psychoanalysis as the dominant discourse or those from the present that 
reflect an understanding of the mind derived from empirical studies of 
the brain.
I invoke this dictionary and the relatively new science of sentiment 
analysis to question some of the assumptions held by those promoting 
versions of machine reading and also to question the possibility of 
formalized and fully automated reading. This is to say, there cannot be 
an automated reading of a text that is free of the “taint” of subjectivity. 
Reading, I would claim, is always situated. Best and Marcus were wrong 
to imagine and hope for analysis free of subjectivity and digital humanists 
are wrong to insist on the separation of methodology and data from 
the act of interpretation. But I would hesitate to ask digital humanists 
to limit the application of their methods to historicist approaches that 
would take, as an example, this Jungian dictionary and apply it to literary 
works that appeared at the exact same time and in circulation with this 
psychoanalytic discourse. To do so would be to give up on much of the 
promise of digital methods and produce only a slight improvement over 
existing historicist readings. At the same time, we should recognize that 
computational science itself is always historicizable. Even though they tend 
to increase, data resolutions and system capacities are subject to hardware 
limitations. Algorithms change or “evolve” and are constantly subject to 
modification. Bugs are discovered and new ones introduced. Scientists 
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depending on complicated configurations of software known as “pipelines” 
or workflows are discovering this. In addition to archiving collected data, 
these scientists are now seeking to archive the exact versions of software 
used to analyze and produce the final end products of their pipelines.5 Not 
just software, but also the hardware used in data analysis can produce 
differences that can introduce variance into the results of computation. In 
short, just because we are using machines to read text doesn’t mean that 
they give the final, definitive reading.6
TOPIC MODELING AND CRITIQUE
There are, however, other widely used methods of digital reading making 
use of machine learning that do not depend upon either pre-labeled data or 
the assistance of a user-created or pre-supplied set of key terms. The method 
of topic modeling would seem to relieve us of the need for specialized 
dictionaries like the one distributed with WordStat. Probabilistic topic 
modeling, or simply topic modeling, is an emergent digital reading method 
that is quickly becoming popular. This method comes to the humanities 
from the information sciences; to what extent it might still belong to the 
latter is an open question. Topic models are a way to organize a large and 
unlabeled collection of documents into computer-generated thematic 
categories. Rather than supplying a list of hierarchical keywords to group 
documents, the algorithm “discovers” shared topics based on textual 
features that are used to fit documents into the discovered categories. 
Using single words to build our list, we might receive the following output 
of possible topics from Henry Adams’s The Education of Henry Adams:
Topic 0: adams, henry, minister, felt, john, washington, young, hay, asked, 
came, saw, went, point, took, wanted, long, war, century, reason, father.
If we decide to use multiple words to locate possible themes, the multiple 
term units popularly called “n-grams,” we might receive the following 
output:
Topic 0: private secretary, knew better, lord russell, diplomatic education, 
young adams, lord palmerston, young man, young men, free soil, earl 
russell, eighteenth century, english society, fayette square, fifty years, 
foreign affairs, francis adams, henry adams, george washington, half dozen, 
harvard college.
Some of the same words are captured in this second example; “henry” 
and “adams” are now grouped together as they most frequently appear 
this way in this third-person authored autobiography. While the term 
“washington” appears as the name of the city when searching for single 
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words, when we search for two or more word phrases, the algorithm 
returns the proper name. We note that the term “war” no longer appears 
in this, the first topic grouping returned by the algorithm, although “civil 
war” does appear in the second list of possible topics (not displayed).7
However, even these unsupervised implementations of machine-learning 
algorithms are subject to some of the critiques outlined above. For example, 
all machine learning implementations (both supervised and unsupervised) 
capable of performing text-mining need to make some conversion and initial 
reduction of the string of characters that comprise a text or document. 
And if a text has been digitized from a print edition, then one has to 
make a selection of the digital edition. Potentially the machine-learning 
package will attempt to convert the text from one encoding to another, 
for example from the simple ASCII encoding to the more modern UTF-8 
or vice versa. In the process, accents, diacritical marks, and other textual 
features may be removed or translated to equivalent marks. The workflow, 
or automated set of procedures, might perform what linguists refer to as 
lemmatization on the string of words, which is to say, the trimming of each 
word into its smallest meaningful components, as well as removing plurals, 
capitalization, punctuation, and tense. For most humanists, this process 
produces potentially large-scale “information” loss.8 In addition, almost all 
machine learning implementations used on text include what is called an 
exclusion list, or stop words. Stop words are terms that are considered to 
be lacking in semantic content. These words are removed before running 
the text through the algorithm because they are considered superfluous; 
they are “noise” that would make that task of document classification 
much more difficult. MALLET (“MAchine Learning for LanguagE 
Toolkit”), a popular and free topic-modeling package, contains a default 
stop word list of 524 English language words (see McCallum 2002). While 
this set contains words like “you,” “no,” “but,” “and,” and “whatever,” it 
also contains terms of potential interest to the humanities researcher 
like “associated,” “appreciate,” “sorry,” and “unfortunately.” And even the 
words from this previous list—take “whatever” as an example—might have 
important meanings and semantic value depending on genre and period 
(think 1980s valley girl). Each methodological decision in pre-processing 
involves some aspect of interpretation. All of this is to say that within 
humanistic approaches there are no words that do not signify—everything 
is potentially signal and nothing is noise.
As many digital humanists have argued, topic modeling and other 
computer-aided reading methods are just the beginning (see for example 
Liu 2013, 409–23). Traditional interpretive activities take over once the 
distilled and computed results have been generated. Unfortunately, the 
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division between interpretation and method enables us to forget what 
deconstruction has taught us to recognize as the pretext—the whole 
range of presuppositions for conducting the reading, including the 
set of initial conditions or states such as the selection of stop words, a 
spelling and internationalization standard, codes, algorithms, and text 
encoding schemes. Jacques Derrida has shown the way in which an 
“outwork” (hors d’ouvre) functions in Descartes and Hegel to preface 
the “main” philosophical text by stating methodological commitments 
(Derrida 1981, 3–22). For Derrida, the pretext of these “outworks” is 
that they are introductory, that they come before the text; rather, he 
argues, they are produced after the text and are predetermined by the 
text (20).9 Likewise, in digital criticism the task of interpretation cannot 
be framed as isolated from methodological decision making and all 
the algorithmic and computational presuppositions. In a recent article 
examining the history of literary criticism through machine learning and 
topic modeling, Andrew Goldstone and Ted Underwood (2014) attempt 
a rigorous theorization of the digital methods they deploy. They applied 
the MALLET topic modeling application described above to a digitized 
archive of academic journals dedicated to the field of literary studies. 
They deployed these techniques in order to answer the question of when 
“criticism” and “critique” came to dominate literary studies. Goldstone 
and Underwood’s project evinces what might come to be recognized 
as an important turning point in the application of computer reading 
techniques to literary studies: they bring a sharp and critical account of 
these tools while using them to produce readings and counter-narratives 
of their own field formation. Yet there are still some unquestioned 
assumptions that persist in their methodology.
When Goldstone and Underwood search through their archive of 
journal articles for the term “criticism” they depend upon an understanding 
that articles using what they term “critic-words” (words beginning with the 
root-word “critic”) are doing the work of criticism and those that do not 
are not “critical.” Perhaps recognizing this would not alter the story told by 
their model, as they claim that the model only adds “nuance” to an already 
familiar account of the “emergence and subsequent naturalization of the 
discourse of criticism over the whole course of the twentieth century” 
(Goldstone and Underwood 2014, 370). But a nuanced reading of the 
qualitative difference between critical practices and the specific language 
of criticism that self-referentially invokes “critic-words” is foreclosed by 
the rejection of reading practices resulting from theoretically informed 
close reading. There is a risk of creating categorical errors through a 
reliance on the self-evident stability of these categories.
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STRUCTURALISM AND SYSTEMIC CRITICISM
Heather Love’s turn to the social sciences and Goldstone and Underwood’s 
use of topic modeling are part of a larger movement that advertently or 
inadvertently functions to reposition literary study as a science. Goldstone 
and Underwood explicitly place their work in “the recent tendency for 
literary studies to develop stronger connections to social science” (Goldstone 
and Underwood 2014, 379). This movement tends toward sharing the desire 
to answer to Best and Marcus’s call for “objectivity, validity, truth” in 
literary criticism (2009, 17). There are, to be sure, dissenting voices within 
the digital humanities. While arguing that all criticism is algorithmic, 
Stephen Ramsay suggests that rather than longing for a scientific criticism 
“we would do better to recognize that a scientific literary criticism would 
cease to be criticism” (2011, 15). Yet all of these differing approaches can be 
understood to be part of a retrograde movement that nostalgically seeks to 
return literary criticism to the structuralist era, to a moment characterized 
by belief in systems, structure, and the transparency of language. It was 
well before our present concern with re-theorizing the surface of the text, 
prior even to the advent of “symptomatic reading,” that those working 
within literary studies dreamed of the possibilities of a scientific criticism. 
Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism, originally published in 1957, serves 
as one such early work. Frye made the polemical case for a systematic and 
scientific criticism derived from an inductive reading of literature that could 
encompass all of literature. He outlines the expansive scope of his approach 
by creating “a theory of criticism” explicitly modeled after Aristotle “whose 
principles [would] apply to the whole of literature and account for every 
valid type of critical procedure” (1971, 14). This approach would work, he 
argues, because like a scientific investigator, he assumes the existence of 
an order of nature, an order of meanings that lies behind the enterprise 
known as literature and exists as a coherent whole. Discovering the laws 
governing this order becomes the task of the critic. This understanding 
enables Frye to read widely across numerous literatures, to extract major 
modes and archetypes, and to produce a categorization of all these into 
a single organizing schema. Individual texts are then brought, either by 
Frye or a future critic, into the law of the schema and used to establish 
minor variations on a theme. This is what he believes makes his system 
scientific: each revision made by critics and scholars builds progressively 
on the entire body of prior humanistic research. Above all, Frye’s schema 
works in pursuit of what he sees as a set of unalterable structural principles 
that can guide future criticism and reading. It is a “genuine” mode of 
criticism—to be differentiated from the accretion of judgments made 
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by literary taste makers, or what he calls “meaningless” criticism—that 
follows the research models provided by science and “progresses toward 
making the world of literature intelligible” (9).
Frye’s Anatomy creates what he calls a “conceptual universe” in which 
all of literature can be plotted, located, and mapped. His schema are 
ultimately less rigid than we might expect and one particularly important 
feature of Frye’s system is its own open-endedness: he intended that 
categories beyond those major labels that have made his book famous—
the mythic, generic, and archetypal—would de added in order to improve 
his theory and even make it obsolete. Yet as Geoffrey Hartman notes in 
an important critique, the mythic holds a central place in Frye’s system. 
Hartman selects this category because he believes that myth occupies a 
blind spot in Frye’s system. Like our present moment, the possibility of 
a scientific criticism was deployed as a “surface” against the concept of 
depth. This leads Hartman to call Frye’s method a “flattening out” of 
literature in opposition to the “depth criticism and depth psychology” 
of their shared historical moment. Frye’s Anatomy is ultimately spatial. 
The Anatomy charts and maps the literary terrain and in so doing it drops 
what Hartman believes to be an important dimension: time. Claiming 
that “literature unfolds in time rather than quasi-simultaneously in 
space,” Hartman criticizes Frye’s understanding of temporality and 
literary history (1971, 33). The system evades the question of historical 
development by treating all literature as essentially co-occurring and 
finding little use for concepts like tradition, influence, and inheritance. 
This leads to Hartman’s greatest concern. He worries that such 
“archetypal analysis can degenerate into an abstract thematics where the 
living pressure of mediations is lost and all connections are skeletonized” 
(30–31). Without the literary-historical network, the system that takes its 
place finds a series of dead-end nodal points.
Yet this network is precisely what myth requires and what it reworks. 
There are no “pure” forms of myth in Frye’s system, only multiple 
appearances of historically situated myths. Hartman writes, “a writer does 
not confront a pure pattern, archetype, or convention, but a corpus of tales 
or principles that are far from harmonized” (Hartman 1971, 37). Hartman 
was right about the disappearance of history from Frye’s system as a cause 
for concern. History is, after all, one key to humanistic inquiry. Without 
the nuanced understanding of the ways in which ideas and representation 
unfold throughout time, literary critics would be the social scientists 
that Frye seeks to distance himself from. Thus, Frye explicitly rejects the 
sociological reading advocated by critics like Heather Love and the work 
of contemporary digital humanists like Goldstone and Underwood:
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I understand that there is a Ph.D. thesis somewhere which displays a list of 
Hardy’s novels in the order of the percentages of gloom they contain, but 
one does not feel that that sort of procedure should be encouraged. The 
critic may want to know something of the social sciences, but there can 
be no such thing as, for instance, a sociological “approach” to literature. 
(Frye 1971, 19)
What seems most interesting about the many contemporary digital 
humanities projects when compared to prior forms of scientific criticism 
is the deep focus on history. Indeed, these projects seem to have 
incorporated critiques such as the one Hartman makes of Frye, and make 
the temporal dimension central to their inquiry. Very large-scale archives 
such as Google’s “Google Books” enable heretofore impossible readings 
across the longue durée of literary history. Tools like the “Ngram Viewer” 
make the historical tracking of word or phrase genealogies through almost 
all of print history a trivial task. Thus these projects could be understood 
as answering Hartman’s main complaint of the systemic and scientific 
approach to literature. And yet I want to argue that the hermeneutical 
critique of what Hartman calls the “sweet science” remains helpful advice 
to the would-be scientific literary critic.
DISTURBING CRITICISM?
Frye’s archetypal system shares much with structuralist criticism of the 
1960s and 70s. Both approaches seek to organize all of literature into 
well-defined categories and take as a founding assumption the existence of 
an ordered world that could be illuminated through progressive critique. 
Like Frye, the structuralists explicitly referred to their practices as a 
science. This was in part because structuralism came to the humanities 
from the social sciences, but also due to its status as a classificatory 
methodology. In his well-known 1967 essay “From Science to Literature,” 
Roland Barthes describes the structuralist commitment to taxonomy:
Structuralism, by virtue of its method, pays special attention to 
classifications, orders, arrangements; its essential object is taxonomy, or the 
distributive model inevitably established by any human work, institution, 
or book, for there is no culture without classification; now discourse, or 
ensemble of words superior to the sentence, has its forms of organization; 
it too is a classification, and a signifying one. (Barthes 1989, 6)
For many, structuralism was essentially a formalism. Like Frye’s system it 
erased history and like the New Historicism that would eventually follow 
structuralism, it operated synchronically rather than diachronically. It 
formed schema based on the presupposition of a closed world of meaning 
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that enabled the taxonomization of texts and the components of a text. 
The forms or categories, however, were not necessarily considered 
objective and arguments over selection and categorization prevented the 
production of any truly definitive readings.10 It understood itself as an 
improvement upon what has become known as New Criticism primarily 
through the introduction of Ferdinand de Saussure’s division between 
langue and parole. Structuralists understood each individual textual object, 
the closed world of the poem as theorized by the New Criticism, as an 
instance of enunciation, or what Saussure called parole, and recast the 
object of criticism as the system, the langue, which produces the grounds 
of possibility for the individual poem. Consequently, they desired a larger 
object of critique and to accompany it a common language to be used by 
the community of scholars. They realized that certain formalist methods 
that depended upon close reading would not, to use one of today’s popular 
terms within computational fields, “scale.”
Barthes’s turn from structuralist to poststructuralist hinges on his 
discovery that there is no “neutral state of language” that would allow 
literary criticism to become a scientific enterprise; structuralism cannot 
“call into question the very language by which it knows language” (Barthes 
1989, 7). Contra the structuralists and the New Critics, there were no closed 
worlds and no “common language.” Barthes argues that the descriptive 
language of scientific discourse is not a metalanguage, a “superior 
code,” but merely one code co-existing and layered among many others. 
Deconstruction, the most prominent mode of poststructuralist thought, 
called into question the stability of the spatial features that enabled 
Frye’s charts and maps by drawing attention to what could be thought 
of as the continental drift active underneath the surface. Deconstruction 
questioned the oppositional forms that enable structuralism to establish 
categories. In pushing aside this fundamental insight from deconstruction, 
as well as the various forms of political critique that remain linked with 
this project, the digital humanities work described in this essay repeats 
the categorical errors of structuralism.11
While literary critics were still engaged in forms of critique influenced 
by Frye and the structuralists, Sigurd Burckhardt produced a strong 
critique of the mechanical tendencies found in these methodologies. 
Burckhardt’s “Notes on the Theory of Intrinsic Interpretation” appeared 
as an appendix to his Shakespearean Meanings (1968). This essay sought to 
revitalize literary criticism primarily through the division of intellectual 
labor into two categories: explanation and interpretation. His own 
categorizations enable him to make an unusual defense of hermeneutics 
by arguing against the understanding of interpretation as the description 
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of the way in which a work of literature “works.” Interpretation is not the 
accounting for why a text follows certain mythic laws or archetypes but 
a mode of discovery that takes as its primary object the text itself. At the 
same time, if the surface reading and digital readings of the present reject 
the conception of “depth hermeneutics,” so too does Burckhardt’s theory. 
For what calls his reading practice into action is not the deeply buried 
symptom, the sense of deep meaning to be revealed by the critic, but 
something on the surface that troubles our ability to give a structuralist 
account of the text.
Burckhardt argues that insofar as it has a methodology capable of 
supporting a theory, science is intrinsic. By this Burckhardt means, like 
Northrop Frye, that science understands the universe as ordered and 
organized by a set of discoverable laws. Like the religious belief that 
science has made obsolete, the entire world postulated by empiricism is 
subject to intrinsic analysis. Everything must have a place and meaning. 
Interpretation, according to his account, “would mean the attempt to know 
the law of a poem solely from the poem itself, on the necessary assumptions of 
the infallibility of the poem. Explanation, on the other hand, would mean 
the attempt to demonstrate how parts of a poem obey an already known, 
established principle” (1968, 298).
Interpretation and explanation map onto, respectively, intrinsic and 
extrinsic analysis. Frye’s conception of the “order of words” necessitates 
an intrinsic approach and this shares some assumptions with those 
of Burckhardt. Burckhardt, however, places his emphasis on the 
hermeneutical act called into being by the intrinsic method. While 
the residual New Critical focus on poetry and the single poem draws 
Burckhardt toward the poem as his unit of interpretation, there is no 
reason why this procedure should be limited to a single poem, to poetry, 
or even to a single novel. Indeed it seems entirely likely that Burckhardt’s 
hermeneutical approach is exactly what we need for the large archives 
studied with digital approaches. One does not have to necessarily follow 
Burckhardt in his belief that each textual object is a “unit” or world with 
knowable rules in order to understand the force of his critique of certain 
strains of structuralist thinking. What I mean to say is that Burckhardt’s 
conception can revitalize the digital humanities-cum-structuralist reading 
practices that we find at the present moment.
Returning to Goldstone and Underwood, we might want to think 
about ways in which they invoke the concept of the hermeneutical circle 
as it relates to digital reading. They invoke a soft hermeneutics when they 
write “in the end we must always close the hermeneutic circle with human 
interpretation” (2014, 10). I agree with them that the digital humanities 
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cannot function without “human interpretation,” but I resist the division 
between interpretation and method that renders method totally free 
from interpretation. In their version of the circle, the human interpreter 
comes after; interpretation, according to their logic, proceeds from 
algorithmic output. They want to extend “human interpretation” over 
very large archives, over collections of documents and texts that would 
be too large for a human interpreter. Yet in an important way the circle 
remains incomplete. When Hans-Georg Gadamer produced a definition 
of the hermeneutic circle he made the point that the concept “is based 
on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness” (1989, 262). The poles in 
Gadamer’s circle are less rigidly defined than allowed for by much work in 
the digital humanities and “strangeness” extends all the way through the 
project of criticism, not just to an examination of the results.
Yet there are ways to turn the major presupposition of digital reading 
techniques such as machine learning back against itself. Classification, 
whether machine or human derived, fits observed data or objects into 
distinct categories. The important difference between human and machine 
classification, however, is what draws us to categorize data into categories 
and our doubt about this categorization. The algorithm assumes that all 
data will “fit.” Within machine learning there are concepts to label the 
degree to which data fits into categories: we call any potential uncertainty 
within classification confusion or simply “error.” The outlier, that peculiar 
object not belonging to the domain of one law or another, might present 
some difficulty to categorize for the algorithm, but it is of high interest 
to the human interpreter because it represents a problem. Burckhardt 
draws our attention to the way in which when we are reading we encounter 
something that he calls a “stumbling block” (1968, 289) that becomes the 
occasion for analysis:
What occurs, then, when I really do interpret? Something which in principle 
is very simple. I read a poem and the poem “speaks to me.” At the same time, 
however, or perhaps only after several readings, I get the impression that I 
have not yet grasped its true significance. Something “disturbs” me. What 
it is that will “disturb” me is never predictable. It may be a “discrepancy” (a 
contradiction, sometimes purely factual, which seems to reside in the poem 
itself); it may be an apparent whim of the poet or a seemingly inappropriate 
word; it may be configuration whose meaning is obscure; or it may be (as 
with Hölderlin’s late hymns) that the coherence of the whole completely 
escapes me. Finally any conception of the poem which contradicts my own 
may also disturb me in this sense. (Burckhardt 1968, 301)
Burckhardt’s “stumbling block” functions much like the effect of the 
punctum in Roland Barthes’s account of the photographic image. For 
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Barthes, what disturbs the interpreter is the appearance of a “sting, speck, 
cut, little hole” within the field of the image, what he calls the studium 
(1981, 26–27). The punctum produces the occasion for interpretation: “the 
photographer’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises 
me, is poignant to me)” (27). Burckhardt faults the dominant contemporary 
theory of his time, structuralism, for not paying enough attention to 
those objects that do not fit within preexisting strategies. This critical 
science has pushed such difficult to categorize elements aside in favor of 
generalizations and secure categorizations.
To return to my titular question: can an algorithm be disturbed? In the 
case of computer-aided text mining and machine-learning algorithms, the 
ever-present risk is that they cannot. Digital readings resist and reduce 
disturbance—it is only when they fail to be properly iterative that they 
might be said to be “disturbed.” Algorithms, of all kinds, are recipes for 
success. They are a description, an ordering of operations, which can be 
iteratively executed to produce a “correct” result.12 Failure, as opposed to 
algorithmic success, might be the special providence of humanists. It is in 
another essay found in Beyond Formalism that Geoffrey Hartmann describes 
interpretation as requiring either the location of a space in between the 
text or the opening of that space by the critic: “Interpretation is like a 
football game. You spot a ‘hole’ and you go through. But first you may have 
to induce that opening. The Rabbis used the technical word patach, ‘he 
opened,’ for interpretation” (Hartman 1971, 255). For Hartmann, literature 
is special because it has the capacity to sustain the hole. Interpretation 
exists within a space that might be thought of as in between the “bits” of 
language. When we allow our algorithms to overly familiarize that which is 
fundamentally ambiguous, we risk turning our work, the project of literary 
criticism, into what Burckhardt would call explanation. This activity of 
explanation risks too quickly closing down the disturbing possibility of 
texts. In privileging explanation over interpretation digital humanists 
might be tempted to exploit the cunning of empiricism to ideologically 
suppress interpretive moves and in the process marginalize a certain 
kind of questioning of the critical “pretext.” Perhaps we can use machine 
learning and other computer-aided reading techniques to open holes by 
deploying the algorithm against itself, but ultimately interpretation is an 
interesting and compelling narrative of how one deals with being “pricked” 
by a text, by being disturbed.
Throughout this essay I have argued that the present movement 
in criticism that seeks to reposition literary studies as a social science 
is resurrecting the project of structuralism. The computer-aided text 
mining practice of the digital humanities provides us with an important 
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case study through which we can examine the stakes of this swerve 
away from much of the contemporary critical discourse. This discourse 
remains, as Rita Felski shows us, quite suspicious (2009, 28–30). But these 
suspicious interpretive practices have enabled a whole range of important 
political projects that have made what was once invisible visible and have 
moved what was once on the margins to the center. An entire generation 
of critics disturbed by absences and tightly constricted categories that 
reinforced ideological thinking about difference has rightfully questioned 
the self-assurance with which prior critics deployed what they conceived 
of as politically neutral methodologies. A criticism that, once again, seeks 
to authorize itself through an appeal to the social sciences cannot ignore 
the insights of these political projects nor can it so easily push aside the 
deconstructive critique of the first literary science, structuralism.
NOTES
 This essay was greatly improved through the critiques and contributions of my 
anonymous readers. Thanks also to Graham MacPhee for several clarifying 
comments and questions. I brought an early draft of this project to my seminar 
at the Futures of American Studies Institute in 2014 and would like to thank 
three participants: Kristie Schlauraff, Dan Sinykin, and especially Moacir P. 
de Sá Pereira. I must also acknowledge Donald E. Pease for his invaluable 
suggestions and support. Special thanks to Louis A. Renza.
 1 As I work within American literary studies, many of my references will be the 
local application of what I describe as larger movements within the humanities. 
On description as method, see Heather Love, “Close But Not Deep: Literary 
Ethics and the Descriptive Turn,” (2010). An example of the renewed interest 
in literary aesthetics can be found in Looby and Weinstein 2012, 1–19. For an 
example of the new formalism, see Otter 2008, 116–25.
 2 Rita Felski has made this argument in several locations. She offers some 
suggestions of what might come after suspicion, after critique: “Critique needs 
to be supplemented by generosity, pessimism by hope, negative aesthetics by a 
sustained reckoning with the communicative, expressive, and world-disclosing 
aspects of art” (2009, 33).
 3 See the documentation provided at www.provalisresearch.com/products/
content-analysis-software/wordstat-dictionary/sentiment-dictionaries.
 4 Martindale 1975. The digitized version of Martindale’s dictionary can be 
found at: www.provalisresearch.com/products/content-analysis-software/word 
stat-dictionary/regressive-imagery-dictionary-by-colin-martindale-free.
 5 The problem of discovering and sharing data provenance has become a pressing 
issue for many computational fields. The following has been offered as a vision 
for an “ideal world”: “users would be able to reproduce their results by replaying 
previous computations, understand why two seemingly identical runs with the 
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same inputs produce different results, and find out which data sets, algorithms, 
or services were involved in the derivation of their results” (Moreau et al. 2008, 
54).
 6 Key references on this aspect of the digital humanities include Ramsay 2011, 
7–9; Jockers 2013, 26–30.
 7 Both examples are from running Henry Adams’s The Education of Henry 
Adams through the CountVectorizer topic-modeling algorithm provided with 
the Python-based package called “sci-kit learn”: www.scikit-learn.org. The 
complete ASCII text of The Education of Henry Adams used for these examples 
was produced by Richard Fane and distributed by Project Gutenberg, and is 
available at: www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2044/pg2044.txt
 8 One of the most popular stemming algorithms is the Porter Stemming 
algorithm. This is incorporated within the workflows as a preprocessing step 
by many packages including Provalis Research’s WordStat. See Porter 1980, 
130–37.
 9 Another Derridean concept, the “parergon” or frame that we take to exist 
outside the space of the work of art, might be useful in understanding the 
stakes involved in suggesting the existence of non-signifying elements of a text 
(Derrida 1987, 97–98).
10 For a general theoretical and historical background on structuralism, its main 
currents of thought, and adoption within the American academy, see Scholes 
1974. Scholes describes the assumption of an a priori order of the world: “The 
perception of order or structure where only undifferentiated phenomena had 
seemed to exist before is the distinguishing characteristic of structuralist 
thought” (Scholes 1974, 41). See also, Culler 1975, 37–63.
11  Geoffrey Hartman destabilizes Frye’s spatialization of literature by 
introducing the problem of temporality to Frye’s understanding of literature 
as unfolding “quasi-simultaneously in space” (Hartman 1971, 32–33). The 
classic deconstructive critique of structuralism based on a “decentering” of the 
structure is Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences” (Derrida 1978, 278–93).
12 In this essay I am addressing the use of a subset of computer algorithms, 
machine-learning algorithms. These algorithms, by necessity, fit all supplied 
data into a set of categories. To my larger point about algorithms, I have 
invoked Burkhardt’s sense of the hermeneutical “stumbling block” that appears 
during reading to call into question our reliance on the separation between 
methodology—here we should understanding reading, both computer and close 
as the methodology—and interpretation, and the way in which the algorithmic 
thinking denies the possibility of being disturbed and the situated or 
idiosyncratic reading. In his introductory text to algorithms, Thomas Cormen 
defines an algorithm as “a set of steps to accomplish a task that is described 
precisely enough that a computer can run it.” He continues to refine this concept 
through the addition of iterability: “Computer algorithms solve computational 
problems. We want two things from a computer algorithm: given an input to 
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a problem, it should always produce a correct solution to the problem, and it 
should use computational resources efficiently while doing so” (2013, 1–2). See 
also the explanation of error handling algorithms in Cormen’s co-authored 
Introduction to Algorithms: “An algorithm is said to be correct if, for every input 
instance, it halts with the correct output. We say that a correct algorithm solves 
the given computational problem. An incorrect algorithm might not halt at all 
on some input instances, or it might halt with an incorrect answer. Contrary to 
what you might expect, incorrect algorithms can sometimes be useful, if we can 
control their error rate” (Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein 2009, 6).
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